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Abstract
Globalization demands a global diplomacy adaptable to regional requirements.
In the Asia-Pacific area the close engagement between the Association of South-East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States of America (US) remains a key founda-
tion for regional peace, security and prosperity.
For ASEAN the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia (TAC) is a
legal code of conduct governing relations in the region. The US acceded to the TAC in
2009. That was a very significant symbol of collective political commitment offering
useful juridical foundations for the implementation of the Joint Vision Statement on the
ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership released in November 2005. This partnership must
continuously be adapted to new dynamics and realities.
By the Joint Statement of the 4th ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting of November 20,
2012, the door was officially open to elevate this partnership to a strategic level. The US
endorsed ASEAN centrality in future attempts to build a new regional architecture.
Defining a long-term workable and comprehensive strategy requires more ener-
getic diplomatic efforts from all parties for deepening and broadening multi-dimensional
cooperation in South-East Asia in the years to come.
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ÊÓËÃÑºÊÁÒ¤Á»ÃÐªÒªÒµÔáËè§àÍàªÕÂµÐÇÑ¹ÍÍ¡à©ÕÂ§ãµé Ê¹ Ô¸ÊÑ­­ÒäÁµÃÕáÅÐ¤ÇÒÁÃèÇÁÁ×Íã¹
àÍàªÕÂµÐÇÑ¹ÍÍ¡à©ÕÂ§ãµ? (TAC) à»ç¹¨ÃÃÂÒºÃÃ³·Ò§¡®ËÁÒÂ´éÒ¹¤ÇÒÁÊÑÁ¾Ñ¹¸ìã¹ÀÙÁÔÀÒ¤
ÊËÃÑ°ÍàÁÃÔ¡ÒÂÍÁÃÑºÊ¹ Ô¸ÊÑ­­ÒÁÔµÃÀÒ¾áÅÐ¤ÇÒÁÃèÇÁÁ×Íã¹àÍàªÕÂµÐÇÑ¹ÍÍ¡à©ÕÂ§ãµéã¹»Õ 2552 «Öè§
à»ç¹à¤Ã×èÍ§ËÁÒÂ·ÕèÊÓ¤Ñ­¢Í§¾Ñ¹¸¡Ô¨ ·Ò§¡ÒÃàÁ×Í§â´ÂÃÇÁ«Öè§à»ç¹ÃÒ¡°Ò¹·Ò§¡®ËÁÒÂ·Õèà»ç¹»ÃÐâÂª¹ì
ÊÓËÃÑº¡ÒÃ´Óà¹Ô¹¡ÒÃ¢Í§á¶Å§¡ÒÃ³ìÇÔÊÑÂ·ÑÈ¹ìÃèÇÁÇèÒ é´ÇÂ¤ÇÒÁà»ç¹ËØé¹ÊèÇ¹·Õèà¾ÔèÁ¾Ù¹ÃÐËÇèÒ§ÊÁÒ¤Á
»ÃÐªÒªÒµÔáËè§àÍàªÕÂµÐÇÑ¹ÍÍ¡à©ÕÂ§ãµéáÅÐÊËÃÑ°ÍàÁÃÔ¡Ò«Öè§¨Ñ´·Óã¹à´×Í¹¾ÄÈ¨Ô¡ÒÂ¹ 2548 ¤ÇÒÁ
ÃèÇÁÁ×Í¹Õé¨ ÐµéÍ§ ¹Óä»»ÃÑºãªéà¾×èÍãËéà»ç¹¾ÅÈÒÊµÃìãËÁèáÅÐà¡Ô´ ¼Å·Õèà»ç¹¨ÃÔ§ÍÂèÒ§µèÍà¹×èÍ§
á¶Å§¡ÒÃ³ìÃèÇÁ¢Í§¡ÒÃ»ÃÐªØÁ¼Ùé¹íÒÍÒà«ÕÂ¹ __ ÊËÃÑ°ÍàÁÃÔ¡Ò¤ÃÑé§·Õè 4 àÁ×èÍÇÑ¹·Õè 20 ¾ÄÈ Ô¨¡ÒÂ¹
2555 à»ç¹¡ÒÃà»Ô´ »ÃÐµÙÍÂèÒ§à»ç¹·Ò§¡ÒÃà¾×èÍÂ¡ÃÐ Ñ´º¤ÇÒÁÃèÇÁÁ×Í¹ÕéãËéÍÂÙèã¹ÃÐ Ñ´ºÂØ·¸ÈÒÊµÃì ÊËÃÑ°
ÍàÁÃÔ¡Òä é´ÃÑºÃÍ§¤ÇÒÁà»ç¹ÈÙ¹Âì¡ÅÒ§¢Í§ÊÁÒ¤Á»ÃÐªÒªÒµÔáËè§àÍàªÕÂµÐÇÑ¹ÍÍ¡à©ÕÂ§ãµéÊÓËÃÑº¤ÇÒÁ
¾ÂÒÂÒÁã¹Í¹Ò¤µ·Õè¨ ÐÊÃéÒ§à»ç¹Ê¶Ò»ÑµÂ¡ÃÃÁáËè§ÀÙÁÔÀÒ¤ãËÁè
¡ÒÃ¡ÓË¹´ÃÐÂÐàÇÅÒ¡ÒÃ·Ó§Ò¹ã¹ÃÐÂÐÂÒÇáÅÐ¡ÅÂØ·¸ì·Õ è¤ÃÍº¤ÅØÁ¨ÐµéÍ§ãªé¤ÇÒÁ
¾ÂÒÂÒÁ·Ò§¡ÒÃ·ÙµÍÂèÒ§¨ÃÔ§ Ñ¨§¨Ò¡·Ø¡½èÒÂà¾×èÍ¤ÇÒÁÃèÇÁÁ×Íã¹àªÔ§ÅÖ¡áÅÐàªÔ§¡ÇéÒ§ã¹ËÅÒÂÁÔµÔã¹ÀÙÁÔÀÒ¤
àÍà«ÕÂ µÐÇÑ¹ÍÍ¡à©ÕÂ§ãµéã¹Í¹Ò¤µ
I. THE FRAMEWORK
In an appropriate Asian context, Henry
Kissinger made the assertion that “The con-
tinents interact, but they do not necessar-
ily understand each other”.1 As the winds
of monumental changes are blowing in
many parts of the world today, it is the re-
sponsible role of diplomacy to contribute
to making inter-continental understanding
possible. This is not an easy task during
the irreversible process of globalization
which demands a new diplomacy more flex-
ible and adaptable to regional specificities
and requirements.
If development recommends itself as a
universal concern, development-centered
globalization must become a common
cause at the planetary level.
In terms of development, the Asia-Pa-
cific area is emerging as the epicenter of
future global economic growth leading to
a scenario where the current century is
expected to enter contemporary history as
the Asia-Pacific Century. Consequently,
adequate attention should be given to
South-East Asia and its main institutional
structure represented by the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) estab-
lished in 1967.2
With its ten members (Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) ASEAN
is home to about 620 million people, 60
per cent of whom are under 30 years of
age. Its combined GDP is the third largest
in Asia, after China and Japan. It covers an
extraordinary spectrum of cultures, reli-
gions and political systems. Its members
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these meetings have been traditionally used
by the chiefs of US diplomacy to review in
a pragmatic manner contemporary politi-
cal, security, economic and development
cooperation issues within the well-estab-
lished dialogue relations with the ASEAN
Foreign Ministers.
In addition, a great number of periodic
dialogue meetings with the participation of
senior officials from the two sides facili-
tate a more detailed and systematic review
of political and security, economic, func-
tional and development cooperation activi-
ties.
To give substance to it, ASEAN and
the US signed the ASEAN-US Joint Dec-
laration on Cooperation to Combat Inter-
national Terrorism on 1 August 2002 and
later adopted a Work Plan to implement it.
A further evidence of the political will
of both sides to strengthen ASEAN-US re-
lations is offered by the Joint Vision State-
ment on the ASEAN-US Enhanced Part-
nership of November17, 2005. Its provi-
sions were made more specific in A Plan of
Action to implement the Joint Vision State-
ment, signed on July 27, 2006 by the For-
eign Ministers of ASEAN and the US Sec-
retary of State.
From the legal point of view, the most
significant  and promising event took place
during the ASEAN Post Ministerial Con-
ference + US in Phuket, Thailand, on July
22,2009,when the US signed the 1976
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-
east Asia (TAC)(6). More substantive ref-
erences will be made to this legal instru-
ment in these pages, as the US signature is
a clear legal proof of its political and secu-
rity commitment to the ASEAN area and
this very fact is expected to contribute by
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have linked their destinies to a regional in-
stitution unique by its content and finali-
ties.3
In accordance with article 2 of the 
ASEAN Charter which entered into force 
on December 15, 2008, all Member States 
of this organization shall act in accordance 
with a set of principles from which we 
mention: respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all ASEAN Mem-
ber States; the centrality of ASEAN in ex-
ternal political, economic, social and cul-
tural relations, while remaining actively 
engaged, outward-looking, inclusive and 
non-discriminatory.4
The history of the official ASEAN-US 
dialogue goes back to 1977.5 Its content is 
characterized by a great diversity of issues 
on the agenda, including: exchanges of 
views on political and security matters; 
cooperation in commodities, market and 
capital access; transfer of technology; de-
velopment of energy resources; shipping 
and food security.
At the beginning of the 21st century 
ASEAN and the US focused more on trade 
and investment, technology transfer and 
human resources development.
At present, ASEAN- US cooperation 
encompasses a much more  impressive 
multitude of sectors, including political and 
security matters, economic and trade ex-
changes, social, cultural and development 
cooperation.
From the institutional and organiza-
tional perspective, the US is being repre-
sented on a continuous basis in major con-
sultative meetings with ASEAN: the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the 
Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC). All
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its strong and far-reaching impact to re-
gional peace and security.
In 2009, after the entry into force of
the ASEAN Charter, the US appointed its
first Ambassador to ASEAN.7
In the political sphere of US-ASEAN
relations, President George W. Bush was
supposed to be the first American presi-
dent to attend a summit meeting with the
ASEAN leaders in May 2007, but this
meeting was canceled. Consequently, the
honor of being the first US president to
participate in a summit meeting with
ASEAN fell to Barack Obama. The event
took place in Singapore on November 15,
2009 and it was largely interpreted as a
qualitatively new development in a succes-
sion of diplomatic efforts meant to infuse
more substance and predictability to the
US-ASEAN relationships.
As the Joint Statement issued by the
US and ASEAN on June 28, 2005, shows,
the key strategic issues shaping ASEAN-
US relations include: ongoing commitment
to the reconstruction of tsunami-devastated
areas; significant and growing trade rela-
tionships; co-operation in fighting terror-
ism; ensuring the security of critical wa-
terways; a shared commitment to halting
the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction-related technology; and joint ef-
forts to prevent the spread of diseases like
avian influenza, and so on.
While geopolitics  is not a concept fre-
quently associated with ASEAN, the close
engagement between ASEAN and the US
as defined in relevant documents remains
a key foundation for promoting  regional
peace, security and prosperity. The ASEAN
Regional Forum mentioned above is the
primary and for the time being the only
forum for enhancing political and security
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
ASEAN is proclaimed and is expected to
continue to be in the “driver’s seat” in that
structure and its position has to be further
recognized and respected for strong stra-
tegic reasons.
The common expectations of the par-
ties for their future relations as derived
from their similarity of views on many is-
sues were re-affirmed and updated in the
already mentioned Joint Vision Statement
on the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership,
released in November 2005. This partner-
ship was optimistically described in the
document itself as being comprehensive,
action-oriented and forward-looking, and
comprises political and security coopera-
tion, economic, social and development
collaboration.8
Having in mind the volatile security
situation in Asia, some examples of the
specific components of this partnership are
significant for their highly visible   topical-
ity in 2013: recognition of the importance
of non-proliferation in all aspects of nuclear
weapons in South-East Asia; cooperation
on disaster management; enhancing
ASEAN’s regional energy infrastructure;
and deepening cooperation in science, tech-
nology, information, communications tech-
nology and education.
Listing the major components of the
US-ASEAN cooperation is not enough.
Challenges are not static. Therefore, the
ASEAN foreign ministers and the US Sec-
retary of State developed a Plan of Action
to implement the Enhanced Partnership, as,
in their view, it must attentively and con-
tinuously be adapted to changing dynam-
ics and realities of the current world.
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expected to be used to help foreign citi-
zens build better lives, build nations and
transform futures.10
However, beyond indisputable positive
results in promoting bilateral cooperation,
there are clearly expressed perceptions in
Southeast Asia that this area has been to
some extent neglected by the US. Yet, this
element of perceived indifference in the
American attitude which was being criti-
cized by analysts was in fact less a result
of deliberate policy, rather being due first
of all to some special but temporary cir-
cumstances. Indeed, before 2009 the US
Administration had some other priorities
and felt obliged to focus mostly on press-
ing problems in Iraq, Afghanistan and other
areas of the world.
On the other hand, there is no short-
age of criticism about ASEAN and its dip-
lomatic conduct both at regional and glo-
bal levels. In the light of many negative or
skeptical views about it, irrespective of
their true motivation, this institution is be-
ing described in some American circles as
just a regional “talking shop”.11
If based on obvious evidence, construc-
tive, even sharp criticism proves to be use-
ful in many instances, including the
ASEAN’s case. While scrutinized on the
basis of  some ideal institutional standards,
there is no doubt that ASEAN is not in its
best shape, but at the same time some more
positive and optimistic assessments about
the largest regional organization in South-
East Asia should not be ignored. In this
spirit, having in mind the central theme of
this article, a few authoritative American
and ASEAN pronouncements deserve to
be evoked.
In this regard, in 2008, in a special mes-
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During diplomatic conversations,
ASEAN’s representatives expressed the
wish that the US become an important stra-
tegic economic and development partner
as much as it was already perceived as an
important diplomatic partner. In this con-
text, US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice re-affirmed in 2006 that the US was
eager to work with ASEAN through this
new Enhanced Partnership.
On the economic front, the US is work-
ing to conclude Free Trade Agreements
with countries from Southeast Asia. These
are important future-oriented steps towards
the consolidation of the legal foundations
for a free trade community leading to more
knowledge-based and technology-intensive
economies.9
On the diplomatic front, even before
2009, the US took additional measures and
initiatives to enhance ties with ASEAN
countries, acting in conformity with their
objectives of transformational diplomacy,
as promoted by various diplomatic modali-
ties at regular, public and summit levels.
Thus, the US demonstrated by its own
plans and practical steps  that it was pre-
paring to work with its partners in South-
east Asia to build and sustain democratic,
well-governed states that would respond
to the needs of their people and would con-
duct themselves responsibly in international
affairs.
In order to avoid possible misinterpre-
tations, it has been emphasized over the
years at the highest professional and po-
litical levels that transformational diplo-
macy was rooted in partnership, not in pa-
ternalism. With this clear and pragmatic
understanding  of this original diplomatic
concept, America’s diplomatic power is
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sage addressed to the ASEAN Regional
Forum Senator Barack Obama emphasized
the fact that ASEAN’s impact extends be-
yond South-East Asia and provides the
model for, and in some cases the core of,
many transnational institutions in the Asia-
Pacific region. ASEAN has led efforts to
construct new vehicles for regional coop-
eration and confidence-building among
nations with histories of tension and mis-
trust.12
In a similar spirit, carefully negotiated
documents adopted by ASEAN leaders,
such as the Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration
on the Roadmap for an ASEAN Commu-
nity (2009-2015), and the ASEAN Politi-
cal-Security and Socio-Cultural Commu-
nities Blueprints, as well as more recent
documents to be analyzed in these pages
can contribute by their rich and quite in-
spirational substance to eliminating the
image of ASEAN as being just a “talking
shop”.
The US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton during her first visit to the ASEAN
Headquarters in Jakarta in February 2009,
which represented a historic premiere in
the US-ASEAN relations, stated: “(…) we
have listened to our friends in ASEAN.
They have expressed their concern that the
United States has not been fully engaged
in the region at a time when we should be
expanding our partnerships to address the
wide range of challenges confronting us,
from regional and global security, to the
economic crisis, to climate change and
human rights (…) we believe that the
United States must have strong relation-
ships and a strong and productive presence
here in Southeast Asia (…) an American-
ASEAN partnership is an important part
of our new approach to development and
diplomacy, what we call “smart power”.13
Significant events in 2009-2012 dem-
onstrated that this new approach formu-
lated in programmatic terms by the US Sec-
retary of State Hillary Clinton, the first chief
of American diplomacy who visited all ten
ASEAN countries, has been gradually re-
flected and embodied in comprehensive
documents the implementation of which
has proved to be fruitful both for the US
and for ASEAN.
II. NEW CONTENT
In the Chairman’s Statement of the 15th
ASEAN Summit entitled “Enhancing Con-
nectivity, Empowering Peoples”, Cha-am
Hua Hin, 23-25 October 2009, in the sec-
tion dedicated to ASEAN's External Rela-
tions it was specifically mentioned that the
Leaders of this regional organization
“warmly welcomed the decision by the
United States and ASEAN to convene the
ASEAN-US Summit in Singapore on 15
November 2009 which would mark a his-
toric point in ASEAN-US Dialogue Rela-
tions. The Summit is a reflection of the
strong commitment of the US Administra-
tion to deepen and expand its engagement
with ASEAN. We looked forward to the
United States working closely with
ASEAN to develop our regional connec-
tivity and to playing a pivotal role in con-
tributing to the regional architecture in the
Asia Pacific”.14  The expression “pivotal
role” will be frequently used in many fu-
ture analyses related to the US-ASEAN re-
lations, as the US intends to pursue its
“strategic pivot” to Asia.
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ness to re-engage Southeast Asia, and play
a much more dynamic role in the area. At
the same time, it contained a strong signal
addressed to all parties concerned that the
US cannot be “ignored” in the regional pro-
cesses and in the future institutional struc-
tures of South-East Asia.
Moreover, signing the TAC has opened
the procedural possibility for the US to take
part in the East Asia Summit (EAS). How-
ever, the very functioning of the EAS it-
self still needs many prior clarifications.
These clarifications are more necessary
than ever during the current period char-
acterized by an important strategic trans-
formation in East Asia, as a result of the
rise of China and the emergence of India,
as major powers.
This strategic transformation should
not be treated as a simple geopolitical
event, as it has a direct, strong and far-
reaching impact on the emerging new in-
stitutional architecture in the Asia-Pacific
as a whole. From this perspective, it is quite
natural to interpret the return of the US to
the region as being meant to prevent and
discourage any future attempts of domi-
nation by other powers in the area.
The commitment by the US to become
more closely involved in Asian regional
affairs appears well justified from the
American side, but at the same time it also
generates a new and serious  challenge for
ASEAN which  has not been sufficiently
debated by the members of  this regional
organization. As pointed out above, and
Secretary Hillary Clinton made it clear, the
US also wants “to advance the interest and
values we share”.17 However, while inter-
ests and values are considered to be per-
manent,  the concept of transformational
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As realistically mentioned by Robert 
Fitts, President Barack Obama’s 10-day, 
four-nation tour of Asia in November 2009, 
achieved no headline agreements or politi-
cal breakthroughs. But by its very objec-
tives it should go far to dispel any doubts 
about the seriousness of the US commit-
ment to the region.15
In international politics doubts are, as 
a rule, persistent and solid evidence is 
needed to dispel them. After years of hesi-
tations, the US signed, as noted above, the 
1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC) in Southeast Asia on July 22, 2009 
Shortly before signing the treaty at the 42nd 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phuket, 
Thailand , Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
declared that “the United States is back in 
Southeast Asia”, and that the signing of the 
TAC “seals our commitment to work in 
partnership with the nations of ASEAN to 
advance the interest and values we share”.16
Signing the TAC was not a simple for-
mal act. It had a great legal and political 
significance to be further tested in the years 
to come. The US demonstrated in   a most 
visible way that it changed its previous 
approach toward the region and reflected 
by that gesture a greater understanding of 
the area covered by TAC. Reaching such 
an understanding is an imperative pre-req-
uisite for developing a visionary strategy.
It should be recalled that the prelimi-
nary objections and hesitations expressed 
in the political circles about the TAC were 
largely caused by the apprehension that the 
treaty would limit the US freedom of ac-
tion. Yet, by finally signing it, the US ac-
knowledged that the TAC would not limit 
the US freedom of action.  In fact, the sign-
ing of the TAC symbolized the US willing-
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diplomacy was not  specifically reiterated
in this context as an instrument for the fur-
ther promotion of these interests and val-
ues.
At the first US-ASEAN Summit on
November 15, 2009 President Obama
stated the US intention to re-engage with
ASEAN and other regional bodies. This
was just a preliminary but a significant dip-
lomatic act to be re-enforced by the sec-
ond ASEAN __ US Summit which took
place in 2010.
In anticipation of the second Summit,
as clearly emphasized by ASEAN Secre-
tariat on 15 November 2009, the day of
the historic first ASEAN-US Leaders’
Meeting, this event highlighted ASEAN’s
growing capacity and role in global issues
and the importance of continuing dialogue
at the highest level between the two sides.18
Dr Surin Pitsuwan, the Secretary-Gen-
eral of ASEAN at that time, said that “the
successive and proactive re-engagement of
ASEAN and the US has brought about a
transformation of seismic proportions to
ASEAN-US relations”.19 This re-engage-
ment, he said, comes in the wake of a se-
ries of initiatives undertaken earlier in 2009,
including the visit already mentioned by the
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to
the ASEAN Secretariat in February 2009
and her participation at the ASEAN Re-
gional Forum (ARF) in July 2009 in
Phuket, Thailand.
While evoking the involvement of Thai-
land in this process, it should be recalled
that the US __ ASEAN Summit in
Singapore was co-chaired by Abhisit
Vejjajiva, Prime Minister of the Kingdom
of Thailand at that time, in his capacity as
Chairman of ASEAN, and v by Barack
Obama, President of the United States, who
in his remarks referred to ASEAN as an
“organization of global importance”. Presi-
dent Obama was also quoted as saying that,
the “US is not just a Dialogue Partner but
a member of the ASEAN family due to link-
ages with families in America”.
The Joint Statement of the 1st ASEAN-
US Leaders’ Meeting, dated Singapore, 15
November 2009 is quite comprehensive by
its content.  It has 28 paragraphs and is
suggestively entitled Enhanced Partner-
ship for Enduring Peace and Prosperity.
Its substance is rich and deserves to be sum-
marized below with full respect for its origi-
nal terminology.20
As an initial observation, it can be rec-
ognized that this document charts a new
and promising direction for US participa-
tion in Asian multilateral diplomacy. In-
deed, the Leaders noted with satisfaction
that over the last 32 years of Dialogue re-
lations, ASEAN and the US have devel-
oped mutually beneficial cooperation in
many areas, reflecting their broad shared
interests guided by the Joint Vision State-
ment on the ASEAN-US Enhanced Part-
nership of 17 November 2005, the 2006
Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-
US Enhanced Partnership, and Revised
Priorities for Cooperation under the
ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership 2009.
Implementing into an ambitious part-
nership is a highly complex process. There-
fore, it was decided to establish an
ASEAN-US Eminent Persons Group in
support of enhanced ASEAN-US coopera-
tion in addressing regional and global is-
sues. The recommendations of this Group
will be analyzed below in section IV of the
present article.
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ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission
on Human Rights, which demonstrated the
commitment of the ASEAN Member States
in the promotion and protection of human
rights. The US also supported the Human
Rights Resource Centre for ASEAN, a
track 2 initiative, with a university in
Jakarta as the hub of the Centre and in-
cluding a network of universities through-
out ASEAN.
In a separate paragraph of the docu-
ment under consideration in this section of
the present article the US welcomed the
ASEAN Leaders Statement on ASEAN
Connectivity adopted at the 15th ASEAN
Summit in Hua Hin, Thailand, already men-
tioned above.
The Leaders of ASEAN welcomed the
continued active support of the US in other
regional fora, such as the ARF, which is a
unique and critically important regional
political and security forum.
On economic issues, drawing on valu-
able lessons from the crises of 1997 and
2008, the Leaders resolved to contribute
to reforming the global economic and fi-
nancial architecture to safeguard the glo-
bal economy from future crises, and to pro-
mote regional and global economic growth
and recovery. This reform is also on the
agenda of the United Nations where fur-
ther debates are expected to take place in
2013.
The US re-confirmed its support for
ASEAN’s continuing role in multilateral
efforts where ASEAN has a growing abil-
ity to make contributions. The US Presi-
dent also supported regional efforts initi-
ated by ASEAN and ASEAN-led fora to
address the impact of the global financial
and economic crisis in the region and
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Reflecting a well recognized necessity, 
the Leaders agreed on the need for a 
broader and deeper ASEAN-US coopera-
tion to promote educational exchanges, 
including in science and technology and in 
people-to-people interactions. They 
pledged to increase opportunities for En-
glish language learning and those studying 
overseas in the US and ASEAN. They also 
agreed to explore future areas of coopera-
tion such as people/labor mobility, inter-
faith dialogue and development coopera-
tion.
The US President re-affirmed in clear 
terms the US policy of enhancing engage-
ment with ASEAN which is regarded as a 
key partner in the promotion of peace, sta-
bility and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. The Leaders of ASEAN welcomed 
the US accession to the TAC in Southeast 
Asia, the naming of an Ambassador for 
ASEAN Affairs, the intent to open a US 
Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta, and its 
ASEAN Development Vision to Advance 
National Cooperation and Economic Inte-
gration program.
It is useful and instructive to remind in 
this context that the Leaders shared a vi-
sion of a regional architecture meant to be 
inclusive, to promote shared values and 
norms, and to respect the diversity within 
the region. They agreed to work closely 
together in building this regional architec-
ture, and were ready to study initiatives of 
this nature. They re-affirmed the impor-
tance of ASEAN centrality in this process, 
an aspect of great practical relevance for 
the relations of this regional institution with 
its external partners.
The US President expressed US sup-
port for the establishment in 2009 of the
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looked forward to continued close coor-
dination between such regional efforts and
the global efforts undertaken by the G-20.
On political and security issues, the Lead-
ers resolved to deepen cooperation against
international terrorism under the frame-
work of the ASEAN-US Joint Declaration
for Cooperation to Combat International
Terrorism.
They also agreed to strengthen efforts
to prevent and combat other transnational
crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking, traf-
ficking in persons, money laundering, arms
smuggling, sea piracy, international eco-
nomic crime and cyber crime, in accordance
with national laws and regulations.
Dealing with other significant political
issues, in the Joint Statement the two sides
re-affirmed their commitment to nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament. The
Leaders of ASEAN also welcomed the ef-
forts of the US President in promoting in-
ternational peace and security, including the
vision of a nuclear weapons free world
through efforts such as the agreement be-
tween the US and Russia to reduce their
respective nuclear arsenals through the
START Follow-on Treaty negotiations.
An important assessment in the Joint
Statement referred to the  South-East Asia
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ)
Treaty which would contribute towards
global nuclear disarmament and nuclear
non- proliferation and peace and security
in the region. Consequently, the Leaders
encouraged nuclear weapon states and
states parties to the SEANWFZ to con-
duct consultations, in accordance with the
objectives and principles of the Treaty, to
resolve comprehensively outstanding issues
with the view to ensuring the early acces-
sion of the nuclear weapon states includ-
ing the US to the Protocol of the Treaty.
An appeal of increasing political  reso-
nance in 2013 was launched to North Ko-
rea to return to the Six-Party Talks pro-
cess and to fully implement its commit-
ments made in the September 19, 2005
Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks to
abandoning all nuclear weapons and exist-
ing nuclear programs and returning, at an
early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safe-
guards.
On other global issues the leaders rec-
ognized the critical importance of adapt-
ing to the increasingly severe effects of cli-
mate change in the region and agreed to
strengthen collaboration in both research
on climate impacts and development and
implementation of appropriate policies and
measures.
Another agreement was also reached
to strengthen cooperation on food secu-
rity and on disaster management. The
Leaders of ASEAN expressed their appre-
ciation for the contribution of the US to
disaster relief efforts in the region.
The conclusion of the Joint Statement
contained a short but optimistic message.
In order to sustain the momentum of the
ASEAN-US dialogue partnership after the
Inaugural Leaders’ Meeting, the partici-
pants stressed the importance of continu-
ing dialogue at the highest level between
the two sides.
Philippines was the Country Coordi-
nator for ASEAN-US Dialogue Relations
from July 2009 to July 2012 and contrib-
uted to the drafting of the next five-year
Plan of Action.
President Obama in his Remarks on
November 15, 2009 after the ASEAN __
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summary of the most important of its pro-
visions, using its original terminology, is
fully justified.
The first decision announced in this
document was to accelerate the implemen-
tation of the Plan of Action to Implement
the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership for
Enduring Peace and Prosperity 2011-2015
adopted at the 3rd ASEAN-US Leaders’
Meeting on 18 November 2011 in Bali.
While  there is no consensual defini-
tion of partnership as concept,  paragraph
4 of the document contains an important
and clear reference to the efforts to elevate
the ASEAN-US partnership to a strategic
level and the commitment that the annual
meeting between the Leaders of ASEAN
and the US should be institutionalized from
an ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting to an
ASEAN-US Summit.
A special paragraph deals with the 2011
Declaration of the East Asia Summit (EAS)
on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial
Relations, which reaffirms and elaborates
the broad vision, principles, objectives and
modalities of the EAS. The priority areas
of cooperation under the EAS framework
include energy, education, environment and
disaster management and response. Other
strategic issues of common interest and
concern are also mentioned, such as non-
proliferation and disarmament, maritime
security cooperation, food and energy se-
curity, and ASEAN Connectivity.
From the political point of view it is
necessary to remind that the Statement con-
tains a reaffirmation of the importance of
ASEAN as the driving force of the EAS,
working in close partnership with the other
participants. This may prevent potential
misinterpretations of the role of ASEAN
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US Summit, said: “the United States is 
committed to strengthening its engagement 
in Southeast Asia both with our individual 
allies and partners, and with ASEAN as an 
institution”.21 This commitment, in particu-
lar the reference to ASEAN as “an institu-
tion” is essential for the future relations 
between the USA and this prestigious re-
gional organization which will cross a fur-
ther institutional development in the years 
to come.
Immediately after the ASEAN __ US 
Summit, on November 19, 2009, Kishore 
Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew 
School of Public Policy at the National 
University of Singapore and author of “The 
New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible 
Shift of Global Power to the East”, wrote: 
“The time has come for American strate-
gic thinkers to stop functioning on auto-
pilot, retaining policy prescriptions and 
practices from the past”.22 In other words, 
the US is expected to build a  much stron-
ger partnership with ASEAN, and to dem-
onstrate that it will invest in the future with-
out being captive of its past.
III.A STRATEGIC APPROACH
On November 20, 2012, the White 
House released the Joint Statement of the 
4th ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting, adopted 
in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on November 
19, 2012. This 40 paragraphs document 
covering an impressive range of issues is 
highly significant and symbolic, as it is re-
lated to the commemoration of the 35th 
Anniversary of ASEAN-US relations. Be-
ing the most recent relevant document on 
the topic of the present article, a detailed
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in the EAS.
The ASEAN-US Leaders appreciated
the substantial increase in high-level US en-
gagement in ASEAN-led political-security
fora, including the ASEAN Regional Fo-
rum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Minis-
ters’ Meeting Plus, the EAS, and the Ex-
panded ASEAN Maritime Forum. They
encouraged efforts to strengthen coordi-
nation among these fora, which is stimu-
lating for the diplomatic dialogue on a large
number of issues of common interest.
Paragraph 8 of the document is dedi-
cated to the importance of the US and
emerging role of ASEAN as a US$2.2 tril-
lion engine of global economic growth.
Ever closer economic ties are described as
being of crucial importance to both
ASEAN and the US, as well as to the world
economy. A commitment was formulated
to redouble efforts to increase both two
way trade and investment.
According to US data, total goods
trade between ASEAN and the US in 2011
showed a 9.2% increase to $194 billion.
US foreign direct investment (FDI) stock
in ASEAN countries was US$ 159.6 bil-
lion, up 11.2% from 2010. ASEAN FDI
stock in the United States demonstrated
even stronger growth, increasing 13.1% to
US$ 24.6 billion.
The ASEAN-US Leaders re-affirmed
their commitment to deepen trade and in-
vestment ties and welcomed the launch of
the 2013 ASEAN-US Trade and Invest-
ment Framework Arrangement  Work Plan,
as well as the launch of the US __ ASEAN
Expanded Economic Engagement initia-
tive, which will promote closer economic
cooperation between ASEAN and the US,
and facilitate the pursuit of high standard
trade agreements. They announced the
holding of annual US-ASEAN Business
Summits.
The ASEAN-US Leaders noted the of-
ficial launch of the Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership negotiations as
part of ASEAN’s efforts towards deepen-
ing regional economic integration, as well
as the development of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership as a high-standard agreement,
which will boost trade and investment and
promote regional economic integration
throughout the Asia Pacific region and be-
yond.
An important provision of the State-
ment (paragraph 14) refers to the commit-
ment to resist protectionism and to achieve
strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.
The ASEAN-US Leaders stressed that glo-
bal financial turmoil and elevated commod-
ity prices underscored the urgency for con-
tinued attention through policy coordina-
tion.
The ASEAN-US Leaders paid special
attention to the high human and economic
cost of natural and man-made disasters in
the region and recognized ASEAN’s co-
operative disaster management and re-
sponse efforts which promote a sense of
ASEAN Community and relevance among
its populations. They highlighted consis-
tent ASEAN-US cooperation on disaster
management and response in support of the
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Manage-
ment and Emergency Response and its
mechanism.
On political and legal issues the
ASEAN-US Leaders re-affirmed their
shared interests on the importance of re-
gional peace and stability, which are fun-
damental to growing prosperity in the re-
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to prevent and combat transnational crimes,
such as illicit drug trafficking, trafficking
in persons, people smuggling, money laun-
dering, arms smuggling, sea piracy, armed
robbery against ships, cybercrime and other
forms of international economic crime in
accordance with national laws and regula-
tions.
The US welcomed ASEAN’s goals to
realize an ASEAN Community based upon
adherence to rule of law, democracy, and
the promotion and protection of human
rights, and fundamental freedoms as en-
shrined in the ASEAN Charter.
In the same context, the ASEAN-US
Leaders welcomed positive steps being
taken in Myanmar that could facilitate na-
tional reconciliation, and encouraged fur-
ther progress towards a democratic and
open political and economic system. They
expressed their hope that the US and
Myanmar would continue to deepen their
engagement, including through taking ad-
vantage of Myanmar’s role as Country Co-
ordinator for the ASEAN-US dialogue re-
lations until July 2015.
Elaborating on some past experience
on the matter, the ASEAN-US Leaders
welcomed the US announcement of the In-
novation in Science through Partners and
Regional Engagement initiative, which will
foster cooperation between US and
ASEAN scientists in such areas as pan-
demic flu monitoring and prevention, de-
velopment of low-cost vaccines, drug treat-
ment monitoring, health innovation, and
disease research.
It is appropriate to recall that the
ASEAN-US Leaders discussed the pivotal
role of education in ASEAN in promoting
human resources development, bridging
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gion. They underscored the importance of 
maritime security, freedom of navigation 
and over flight, unimpeded lawful com-
merce, respect for international law, con-
tinued constructive dialogue and peaceful 
settlement of disputes in accordance with 
the universally recognized principles of in-
ternational law, including the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).
The ASEAN-US Leaders recognized 
the importance of the 2002 ASEAN-China 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea and welcomed its 
implementation. They looked forward to 
the early conclusion of a Regional Code of 
Conduct in the South China Sea. At the 
same time, they expressed support for 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on 
ASEAN’s “Six-Point Principles on the 
South China Sea”, adopted on 20 July 
2012, and its effective implementation.
Anticipating, in a sense, future events 
in 2013, the ASEAN-US Leaders re-af-
firmed the critical importance to regional 
and global security of the complete verifi-
able and irreversible denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula. They called on the 
DPRK to comply fully with its commit-
ments under the 2005 Joint Statement of 
the Six Party Talks and its obligations un-
der the relevant United Nations Security 
Council resolutions and abandon all nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programs and 
return, at an early date, to the NPT and to 
IAEA safeguards.
Interesting provisions of the Statement 
were dedicated to the cooperation against 
international terrorism, to the efforts of 
ASEAN and the ARF in addressing cyber 
security matters, as well as to the efforts
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the development gap, enhancing regional
competitiveness, promoting sustained eco-
nomic development, and facilitating friend-
ship and mutual understanding among
people in the region. They looked forward
to continued US support for the ASEAN
University Network (AUN), including
through implementation of an ASEAN
Studies course, which was launched in
ASEAN universities in 2012.
In the diplomatic sphere, the ASEAN-
US Leaders acknowledged the consistent
and productive engagement among the
Committee of Permanent Representatives
to ASEAN, the US Mission to ASEAN and
the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, and ex-
pressed their commitment to work together
to boost the capacity of ASEAN to address
regional challenges. ASEAN appreciated
the US Mission to ASEAN’s efforts in pro-
moting frequent meetings and exchanges
of views with visiting US officials, which
have enhanced common understanding of
ASEAN and US policies, and facilitated
development and implementation of new
programs.
The next ASEAN-US Summit will take
place in Brunei Darussalam in 2013.
IV. PERSPECTIVES
The elaboration of appropriately tar-
geted and calibrated common objectives
and strategies is a highly complex task. The
ASEAN-US Eminent Persons Group
(EPG) has been tasked by the Leaders of
ASEAN and the US to take stock of
ASEAN-US dialogue relations over the
past 35 years and explore ways to deepen
and widen existing cooperation between
ASEAN and the US, as well as to recom-
mend measures for elevating the ASEAN-
US relationship to a strategic partnership.
These recommendations were submitted to
the 4th ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting on
19th November 2012 in Phnom Penh, Cam-
bodia and many of them are reflected in
the Joint Statement already analyzed in the
IIIrd section of the present article.
The major aim of the recommendations
was to elevate ASEAN-US relations from
an enhanced to a strategic partnership to
be formed by 2015. The majority of the
EPG’s recommendations have been in-
cluded in the Statement of November 19,
2012, analyzed above.
The ASEAN-US EPG envisioned a
mutually supportive ASEAN-US relation-
ship focusing on areas of mutual interest
and on strengthening ASEAN. In advanc-
ing ASEAN-US relations, ASEAN central-
ity and its role as the driving force in the
region should be key guiding principles in
achieving regional peace, security, prosper-
ity, and stability.
To enhance ties, deepen economic and
cultural cooperation, and elevate the ex-
isting relationship, the EPG recommended
a cardinal initiative that the Leaders of
ASEAN and the US announce their inten-
tion to form a strategic partnership by
2015.
Some additional recommendations for-
mulated by the EPG are still on the wait-
ing list to be implemented. Five of them
which seem to be the most significant are
presented below.
The first recommendation is to com-
mission a study in coordination between
US-based and ASEAN-based research in-
stitutions with a view to defining a vision
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set a goal to double ASEAN-US trade
within five years and increase investment
in one another’s economies by three times.
Several final recommendations refer to
education. It is suggested to double the
number of ASEAN and US students study-
ing in one another’s countries by 2015, as
well as increase exchanges of researchers
and lecturers. Moreover, in practical terms,
ASEAN and the US should announce a
training initiative designed to train over
10,000 officials and high-potential leaders
from different sectors in less-developed
ASEAN countries within the next two
years with a view to narrowing the dispari-
ties between ASEAN countries.
In keeping with this pragmatic ap-
proach, it has also been recommended to
create an ASEAN-US Center in Washing-
ton D.C.to be a nexus for ASEAN-US tour-
ism, investment, cultural cooperation and
education, enhancing exposure, familiarity
and engagement with ASEAN and US cul-
tures.
How do academics envisage the future
of US-ASEAN relations?
To answer that question we will quote
first of all from an analysis made by Amitav
Acharya. The writer is professor of Inter-
national Relations at American University
in Washington, DC. We refer to an article
adapted from his speech to the inaugural
ASEAN Secretariat Policy Forum, held on
July 14, 2009 in Jakarta, where ASEAN
Secretary General, Dr.Surin Pitsuwan also
launched the 2nd edition of the book: “Con-
structing a Security Community in South-
east Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Re-
gional Order”.
In accordance with Amitav Acharya’s
assessment, to remain relevant, ASEAN is
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for the ASEAN-US relationship by the year 
2020. The study should focus in particular 
on political and security relations, and in-
clude a detailed implementation strategy. 
The study should be completed and deliv-
ered by September 30, 2013 if possible so 
that Leaders can consider the findings and 
recommendations ahead of the 1st ASEAN-
US Summit.
The second recommendation is to en-
courage leading think tanks in ASEAN and 
the US to stimulate thought leadership for 
the relationship by inviting them to pro-
vide an annual report for consideration by 
the ASEAN-US Summit.
The third recommendation is related to 
the support of the goal of a world without 
nuclear weapons and recognition of the 
threat of proliferation to regional and glo-
bal security. In this respect, Leaders remain 
committed to the South East Asia Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty 
and should identify concrete steps to pro-
mote technical cooperation with a view to 
preserving South East Asia as a Zone free 
of nuclear weapons and all weapons of 
mass destruction, enhancing relevant safe-
guard mechanisms in the region and pro-
moting national implementation of the rel-
evant IAEA instruments.
In accordance with the fourth recom-
mendation, Leaders should re-affirm their 
commitment to strengthen the ASEAN 
Secretariat in Jakarta, particularly its ca-
pacity to better assist and facilitate 
ASEAN-US cooperation and more effec-
tively coordinate within ASEAN as well 
as between ASEAN and its external part-
ners.
A fifth recommendation refers to the 
economic sector and asks the Leaders to
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expected to keep its promises by imple-
menting the Blueprint for an ASEAN Com-
munity and the ASEAN Charter. These
documents contain many important ideas
which should be implemented. In this con-
text, ASEAN should improve compliance
by all its members of the new provisions,
rules and mechanisms.23
However, this is not enough. ASEAN
must make additional efforts to be able to
deal with new challenges in an era of rapid
and unexpected developments. It must also
maintain the solidarity of all its members
in dealing with the great powers.
In 2009, under a doctrine of engaging
both friends and foes, a new US policy was
announced that provided for diplomatic en-
gagement with Myanmar’s military regime.
This policy offered an alternative to the
strict sanctions-led policies of the Bill
Clinton and Bush presidencies and re-
moved a recurring impediment to US-
ASEAN ties caused by ASEAN’s insistence
of non-interference in the internal affairs
of member states and US animosity to-
wards the rights-abusing military regime.24
Some analysts believe that a renewed
US interest in the region will be welcomed
by most ASEAN members as a useful coun-
terbalance to China’s surging influence. The
final conclusion is prudent: How the US
calibrates its new engagement, and how
China reacts, will go some way in deter-
mining the region’s future stability and
prosperity.25
Beyond mutual understanding, mutual
interests have a greater practical impor-
tance. A new partnership based on mutual
interests demands a new vision about
Southeast Asia. The ASEAN area is be-
coming a real force in global affairs and
needs to be dealt with on its own terms.
This is not easy because the prevailing ten-
dency is still to see global affairs only
through an Atlantic lens. Such a limited
vision risks distorting Washington’s under-
standing of significant events in the area.
In addition, an incorrect reading of the
forces at work in the region could be det-
rimental to the very pragmatic objective of
harnessing Asia’s dynamism and energy in
promoting both US and ASEAN interests.
Defining a long-term workable and com-
prehensive strategy requires more energetic
diplomatic efforts from all parties for deep-
ening and broadening bilateral and multi-
lateral cooperation in Southeast Asia. Valu-
able lessons can be learned from ASEAN's
diplomatic experience according to which
reforms, institutional arrangements and
decision-making processes should move
forward at a pace comfortable to all par-
ticipants.
Precipitation may prove to be the en-
emy of progress. The old geopolitics of
“win-lose” should be replaced by the un-
ambiguous politics of “win-win” for all. In
order to succeed, this demands a diplomacy
characterized by flexibility, imaginative
work, a greater sense of predictability and
reliability.
What is the future of ASEAN in the
post-American world?  The question is a
complex one as the future world order it-
self is variously described as “multi-polar”,
“non-polar”, “post-American”, “a-polar”,
and there is no general agreement on how
it will evolve.26
At the regional level, the challenges to
ASEAN are numerous, including some bi-
lateral disputes and internal instability in
several ASEAN member states. Imagina-
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issues in previous years. Therefore, it is
estimated that the region would be better
off if it was allowed to resolve this divi-
sion without excessive outside interference.
In this regard, the US is expected to adopt
a measured policy in its support to democ-
racy-building agenda in the area, and needs
to work closely with democratic ASEAN
states to strengthen democracy in these
states.28
Another essential question to be an-
swered in this context is: Can ASEAN sur-
vive in the post-American world? In an
article with the title contained in this ques-
tion by Ary Hermawan it is cogently re-
called that the world is not as it was a de-
cade ago: before 9/11, before the Iraq War,
and, most fundamentally, before the stra-
tegic influence of the US __ once the sole
global superpower __ faded and “the rest”
began to rise. ASEAN was then struggling
amid the Asian financial crisis. Incredibly,
it survived, but a question persists: is it
ready to face the challenges posed by
today’s new world order?29 Persuasive an-
swers are expected to come from ASEAN
itself.
Amitav Acharya, quoted above, as-
serted that ASEAN is facing new global
challenges, but has yet to resolve old re-
gional challenges, which have long under-
mined its development. “At the global level,
we all know about the rise of China. It’s a
challenge because it changes the picture,
the international distribution of power and
influence”, he said at the inaugural ASEAN
Secretariat Policy Forum.30
Another important question is: what
will ASEAN do if rivalry between India and
China escalates? “The best option for
ASEAN is not to take sides in the compe-
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tive diplomatic efforts are necessary to 
identify workable solutions acceptable to 
all parties. Such efforts, involving substance 
and style, should be inspired and guided 
by the provisions of the ASEAN Charter.
V. A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT
Without making specific and direct ref-
erences to ASEAN, some American publi-
cations assert that the current American 
diplomacy regarding   Asia fails to impress 
critics at home. While recognizing that 
President Barack Obama may have planted 
the flag of US diplomacy back in East Asia, 
some diplomatic analysts do not fail to re-
mind unpopular military operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. In this regard, it is noted 
that constraints imposed by cautious Asian 
customs and diplomacy made the success 
of the US policy in  Asia even more diffi-
cult and the US Administration  is being 
criticized for practicing a “diplomacy of 
deference”.27
From the Asian side, in accordance with 
an analysis by Riza Sukma, who is the ex-
ecutive director of the Centre for Strate-
gic and International Studies in Jakarta, it 
is an obvious fact that not all ASEAN coun-
tries share US values, especially democ-
racy, human rights and freedom. In this 
author’s opinion, the inclusion of these is-
sues in the US foreign policy agenda in 
South East Asia might generate complaints 
from individual ASEAN members. How-
ever, it is wrong to assume that the US 
agenda in promoting democracy and hu-
man rights in the region would create new 
division with ASEAN, as this regional in-
stitution has already been divided on such
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tition, and not to approach either power
unilaterally; it has to approach India and
China as a group, rather than half of
ASEAN siding with China, half of ASEAN
siding with India. That would be devastat-
ing for ASEAN”, Amitav Acharya said.31
In Jusuf Wanandi’s opinion, the most
effective way to maintain peace, stability
and economic dynamism is to establish a
regional institution that could accommo-
date the three big powers -- China, India
and Japan -- in a kind of concert of power
that will be able to maintain future equilib-
rium in the region, together with the US.32
The ASEAN Regional Forum is rec-
ommended by scholars to be maintained
for human security (or non-traditional se-
curity) cooperation, but to be credible it
must include defense ministers, have a non-
ASEAN co-chair and a secretariat and be-
come an action-oriented institution (not
only a talk shop for confidence-building
measures).33
On the other hand, a future concert of
powers for East Asia is recommended
which Jusuf Wanandi suggestively calls the
G8 for East Asia. In his view while the EAS
will be composed only of East Asian coun-
tries, the G8 for the region would include
two important strategic countries : the US
and Russia.34 This aspiration received ini-
tial tangibility in 2011 by the admission of
these two states  to the EAS.
From a regional perspective there is an
obvious need for a realistic assessment of
the ASEAN’s past, present and future per-
formance. It is a topic cogently developed
in the article entitled ASEAN: from defi-
ance to accommodation by Kavi
Chongkittavorn. The references from this
article to ASEAN __ US relations are fully
appropriate.35
Watching US-ASEAN leaders talking
about cooperation and coexistence at re-
gional and global levels, one could be op-
timistic that the grouping has taken a new
mode __ a willingness for closer coopera-
tion with dialogue partners to resolve com-
mon challenges, asserts Kavi
Chongkittavorn.36
In his view, in the near future, ASEAN
leaders must show it is worthwhile for the
dialogue partners to increase their engage-
ments with their headquarters through their
permanent diplomatic missions. The US
and China have already decided to open
such ambassadors-led missions in Jakarta
by early 2010. Japan, South Korea, Aus-
tralia, India, New Zealand and the EU fol-
lowed the American example by accredit-
ing their ambassadors to ASEAN.37
VI. CONCLUSION
In the absence of an effective architec-
ture for global governance, the major
achievements in ASEAN-US relationships
should not be over-estimated. Still, what
was already accomplished is highly signifi-
cant. The current US President made crys-
tal clear that his nation understood its stake
in the world’s most dynamic region and that
the US will be at the negotiation table for
the many different dialogues that will shape
its future. ASEAN nations have important
stakes in issues to be negotiated in the years
to come.
President Obama’s visits to Asia in
2009 and 2012 demonstrated that the US
fully accepts that Asia has risen to equal
status with Europe as a centre of growth,
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text?
From the US perspective, the answer
must be clear, as the ASEAN region is vi-
tal to the future of not only the US and
each ASEAN country, but to the world’s
common interests. The administration of
President Obama is committed to strength-
ening these relationships and maintaining
a productive presence in this part of the
world.
This pronouncement is in harmony with
previous assessments on the matter. In a
2007 commemorative publication, the fi-
nal paragraph of the text reads as follows:
“For the United States, ASEAN is a highly
respected institution, a force for positive
change in Southeast Asia, and a wellspring
of inspired and independent growth. With
ASEAN Member Countries we look for-
ward to many more years of fruitful part-
nership as ASEAN achieves its goals for
economic, political, and social develop-
ment”.40
As for the immediate future some re-
cent concerns have to be properly ad-
dressed. An American analyst asserts that
“in Asia, many of the continent’s other
powers had begun worrying about a newly
assertive China. From Japan to Vietnam to
Singapore, governments in Asia signaled
that they would welcome a greater Ameri-
can presence in the region, one that would
assure them that Asia was not going to
become China’s backyard”.41 However, as
cogently reminded by S. Jayakumar,
ASEAN is not prepared to allow external
players to bully ASEAN, because it would
affect ASEAN’s credibility and its position
of being in the “driver’s seat”.42
In the light of all these significant state-
ments, the final conclusion can be a mod-
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vigor and world culture. This development 
was well anticipated.
Before the first US __ ASEAN Sum-
mit, the US Ambassador to Thailand, Eric 
G. John, in his article Committed as ever 
to friendship pointed out that the US has 
two overriding objectives in ASEAN. First, 
it wants the nations of Southeast Asia to 
remain strong and independent, to enjoy 
peace, stability, growing prosperity and 
greater freedom, and to succeed in their 
efforts to integrate. If the countries of 
Southeast Asia are doing well-making 
progress along these lines __ then all par-
ties are in great shape.  Most of US assis-
tance is focused on helping these countries 
__
 and ASEAN as a whole __ achieve suc-
cess, broadly defined.
Second, in the opinion of Eric G John, 
the US looks to the ASEAN region to ad-
dress bilateral, regional and global issues 
ranging from promoting commerce to ad-
dressing climate change to combating the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. The US wants the ASEAN region to 
be a good partner and that requires devel-
oping a good partnership with ASEAN.38
From a non-governmental perspective, 
in his article Asia’s Regionalism Block, 
Michael Auslin, from Asian Studies at the 
American Enterprise Institute, affirms: 
“(...) any future regionalism realistically 
needs the US to be a willing and central 
participant. Because any talk of security 
cooperation without America is wildly pre-
mature, the region’s nations must take care 
not to forget that the US system of alli-
ances undergirds stability in Asia and is 
central to lubricating political engagement 
among countries large and small”.39 But 
how about ASEAN’s centrality in this con-
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erately optimistic one. The US has special
and ever-stronger bonds with ASEAN and
there are persuasive reasons to believe that
after some contemplative process future
diplomatic developments will revalidate
this assessment.
Indeed, as reminded by Henry
Kissinger, “An international system is  rela-
tively stable  if the level of reassurance re-
quired by its members is achievable by di-
plomacy”.43 It can be realistically expected
that diplomacy will facilitate the emergence
of an ASEAN-US strategic partnership
capable to contribute  to giving  tangibility
to the aspiration for a peaceful Asian-Pa-
cific Century.44
The continuation of a rules-based co-
operation and peaceful competition struc-
tured on the basis of strong legal founda-
tions can lead to a results-oriented consen-
sus reflecting common aspirations. The US
and ASEAN share  similar concerns and
responsibilities and are able  to work to-
gether towards a robust strategic partner-
ship inspired by the diversity of national
experiences and values, and  stimulated by
daunting challenges.
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